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Abstract 
 
Feminist scholars have described the behavioural traits that have flourished within the 
global economy in terms of a hegemonic ‘I know best’ masculinity.  Whilst this literature has 
typically focused on a small number of business leaders around whom popular myths of 
wealth creation have developed, the same way of thinking might also be applied to policy-
makers.  At the very least, this study of George Osborne’s time as UK Chancellor of the 
Exchequer reveals how consistently he adopted the mantle of an omniscient hegemonic 
masculine subject in his approach to deficit reduction.  It was an attitude to the task at hand 
I label ‘machonomics’.  This concept is designed to mean more than that the outcomes of 
his austerity programme disproportionately disadvantaged women.  It also captures the 
type of policy-maker that Osborne tried so hard to convince others he was.  His self-
projection finds a parallel, I argue, in what the macroeconomic theory literature describes as 
the specifically ‘conservative policy-maker’, someone reputed for trusting his own 
judgement even in the face of widespread dissent against his anti-social policies.  The 
conservative policy-maker exudes the hegemonic masculinity that Osborne embodied in his 
refusal to voice opinions in public suggesting that there were viable alternatives to painful 
public expenditure cuts. 
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Introduction 
 
George Osborne’s attitude towards macroeconomic policy remains highly relevant.1  His 
tenure as Chancellor was synonymous with a form of macroeconomic governance I want to 
call machonomics.  This is not merely to recognise that his particular brand of austerity 
economics had a disproportionately adverse effect on women (important though this is).  It 
is also not merely to acknowledge that in doing so he and his Treasury officials often ignored 
the requirements of supposedly statutory gender equality legislation (important though this 
is too).  Rather, what I have in mind is the broader style of policy-making through which he 
marshalled the ranks of Conservative MPs seated behind him in the House of Commons to 
embody a self-denying ordinance that they would then project onto society.  In general, this 
requires concerted belief in the countenance of what feminist scholars have long pointed to 
as a hegemonic masculinity that comes into view whenever policy-makers insist that they 
know best what is right for people who live very different lives to their own (Clarke and 
Roberts, 2016, p. 53).  Yet what moves it into the realm of the overtly macho in Osborne’s 
case is that he was prepared to stick to his pre-set plans even when his self-proclaimed 
knowledge of the path that other people must follow overrode their own understanding of 
how they would enact policy were the decision to fall to them.  His most recent 
interventions into discussions of economic policy through his London Evening Standard 
editorials continue to follow exactly the same pattern.  Macroeconomic policy-making might 
always be the province of a hegemonic ‘I know best’ masculinity given the adversarial 
manner in which budgetary politics have traditionally been conducted in the UK (Perkins, 
2015).  But I want to suggest that there was more to it than this and that the concept of 
machonomics captures what was distinctive about Osborne’s approach. 
 
The following analysis is situated in, and owes a great deal to, existing feminist scholarship 
on the masculine biases of macroeconomics.  The relevant literature currently divides in 
two, although not equally so.  The dominant part focuses specifically on outcomes, showing 
how macroeconomic policy, particularly in times of downturn, imposes disproportionate 
costs of adjustment on women (Barker, 1995, p.30).  The less populated part of the 
literature looks behind these outcomes and asks what it is about the theory of economic 
policy-making that facilitates them in the first place (Fukuda-Parr, Heintz and Seguino, 2013, 
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p.17).  It treats the whole realm of tax-and-spend policies as gendered, because the history 
of formally separating the economy’s productive from its reproductive sphere within a 
gendered division of household labour means that decisions to tax less and spend less on 
the whole advantage men (who are typically overrepresented as taxpayers) and 
disadvantage women (who are typically overrepresented as care-givers) (McKay et al, 2013, 
p.115).  Diane Elson and Nilüfer Çagatay (2000, pp.154-5) have identified a deflationary bias 
running right through the structure of contemporary macroeconomic theory that 
exacerbates this gendered inequality. 
 
In what follows, I wish to push this behind-the-scenes analysis one step further.  My focus is 
the content of macroeconomic theory and, in particular, the characteristics of the optimal 
policy-maker who inhabits the purely abstract world depicted in the theory.  I therefore 
seek to bring together insights from two literatures that typically proceed in isolation from 
one another.  Feminist theories of masculinity biases embedded generally in the apparatus 
of macroeconomic policy-making are combined with an analysis of the specialist 
macroeconomic theory that asks how the appointment of a particular type of policy-maker 
can be expected to produce additional sources of economic stability.  The hypothetical 
policy-maker in this theoretical world gets kudos whenever he – and, interestingly, it is 
always depicted as a ‘he’ in its original incarnation – dismisses societal pleas for more 
generous public expenditure settlements and sticks with the low-spending course that he 
deems economically best.  This is the so-called ‘conservative policy-maker’, otherwise 
known as the ‘Rogoff-type policy-maker’ after the person who introduced him to the 
economics literature (see Rogoff, 1985).  He is a hypothetical governance agent whose 
conservatism is defined technically as placing a greater weight on restricting fiscal policy 
activism than the median voter does (Fischer, 1994, p.290).  As will be shown in a later 
section where he is introduced formally, in being consciously unrepresentative of society as 
a whole, the conservative policy-maker thus enforces a deflationary bias that very few 
people would voluntarily mobilise behind if given the choice.  This is the very same 
deflationary bias that feminist scholars have long argued accentuates inequalities within a 
gendered division of household labour. 
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The argument is quite straightforward.  Whilst still Shadow Chancellor, whenever he was 
faced with an audience that was likely to appreciate the references to abstract 
macroeconomic theory, Osborne quoted directly from the theoretical tradition out of which 
the search for a specifically conservative policy-maker arises.  Moreover, as we move down 
a number of levels of abstraction, he also consistently presented himself as a very plausible 
approximation in practice of the hypothetical conservative policy-maker.  It would be to 
stretch the argument too far to suggest that a real-life policy-maker might ever be only the 
embodiment of abstract economic theory.  Nonetheless, the similarities between Osborne 
and his counterpart within macroeconomic theory are still uncanny.  They arise not only 
from the way in which he set his priorities in relation to the presumed ‘needs’ of the 
economy, but also from his choice of accompanying justificatory rhetoric.  Just as the 
hypothetical conservative policy-maker exhibits the macho impulse of self-certainty that he 
is always right, so too, I argue, was Osborne a consistent purveyor of machonomics 
throughout his tenure as Chancellor.  First, though, it is necessary to show that there is an 
argument to be made concerning Osborne and the gendered nature of macroeconomic 
policy outcomes in the period from 2010 to 2016.  This is relatively easy to do, because it 
only requires recognising the existence of a substantial feminist literature on UK austerity. 
 
 
The Gendered Effects of UK Deficit Reduction 
 
Quite a lot has changed since Osborne’s fall from grace, but there has been no move to 
formally retire the Rogoff-type policy-maker that he exemplified in his time as Chancellor.  
The whole rationale for choosing a Rogoff-type policy-maker in the first place is that he 
renders public acquiescence superfluous (Blinder, 1999, p.74).  By contrast, Osborne’s 
insistence that “the British people trusted us to finish” what he had started by returning him 
to the Treasury after the 2015 General Election hints at a much less arm’s-length 
relationship (Osborne, 2015d, p.1).  This is a declaration of having reached the conservative 
policy-maker’s utopia – albeit one that remains unexplored in explicit terms in the relevant 
economic theory – of governing conservatively but doing so consensually.  He boasted of 
having “created a new centre ground around fiscal responsibility and lower welfare”, “a new 
settlement […based on] sound public finances” (Osborne, 2015e, p.5; 2015d, p.5).  However, 
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it is a curious understanding of consent, seeing as opinion polls before the 2015 General 
Election regularly showed that three-quarters of respondents believed that five years of 
public spending cuts had caused an ever deepening social crisis (Toynbee and Walker, 2015, 
p.104).  Moreover, the National Centre for Social Research released its annual British Social 
Attitudes report shortly after the 2017 General Election.  It showed that, amidst a general 
turn away from support for continued austerity, 83% wanted the Government to increase its 
spending on healthcare and 71% on education.  Almost exactly one in two said that they 
were prepared to be taxed more if this is what it took to bring overall levels of state 
expenditure up to more acceptable levels (Clery, Curtice and Harding, 2017, p.3).  The 
macroeconomic theory treats society as a homogeneous entity, as does Osborne’s claim to 
have governed through consent, but the reality is evidently much more complex. 
 
This is unlikely to be a revelation for anyone who is familiar with feminist scholarship on 
macroeconomic policy (Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016, p.891).  It shows how 
contemporary policy common-sense repeatedly reinforces a deeply gendered pattern of 
winners and losers (LeBaron, 2010, p.890).  Generalised consent is therefore unlikely to 
materialise for any macroeconomic vision when women continue to be locked out of 
economic governance structures as both makers and recipients of policy (Walby, 2009, 
p.16).  Cameron and Osborne’s conversion to the cause of austerity economics was 
precipitated by the financial crisis, which in turn was the result of what Brigitte Young and 
Helene Schuberth (2010, p.2) have called a “certain ‘groupthink’”.  Penny Griffin (2013, 
p.12) is surely correct to describe the malfunctioning global financial services industry as “a 
‘boys’ club’ of sorts”, in which the structure of governance routinely instantiates 
predominant models of masculine subjectivity.  However, the policies that have been 
introduced in response to the crisis at heart feature the very same underlying conception of 
the economy as those that led to the original systematic collapse in market valuation 
techniques (Steans and Tepe, 2010, p.810).  They imagine the economy, not as a series of 
interpersonal relationships, but as the culmination of various monetised stocks and flows 
(Young, Bakker and Elson, 2011, p.1).  The task of macroeconomic management in this 
context is to forget that there are people involved and to concentrate instead on hitting 
what are, in essence, arbitrary numerical indicators of policy performance. 
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Every set-piece financial statement that Osborne delivered to the House of Commons during 
his time as Chancellor included excessive detail relating to the interim deficit-reduction 
targets that would be met annually in pursuit of the overall objective of budgetary balance.  
The numbers for spending and borrowing targets would have been meaningless in 
themselves were it not for the fact that he repeatedly asked to be judged on them.  
Arbitrary monetary indicators therefore stalked his every decision, but at his own behest 
(Gamble, 2015, p.48).  Moreover, they did so in a way that can be said to reflect Isabella 
Bakker’s (1994, p.1) notion of a “strategic silence” on gender, but that might also be thought 
of as an act of deliberately forgetting the statutory requirement to understand how his path 
to budgetary balance would impact men and women asymmetrically. 
 
The Fawcett Society (2013) paid much closer attention than the Chancellor and his team to 
the statutory equality audit that is supposed to accompany all significant changes of policy 
course.  The 2010 Emergency Budget was eventually sent for inspection to the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, which had already been called to pass judgement on Osborne’s 
first Comprehensive Spending Review (Pascall, 2012, p.41).  But this was not before Treasury 
officials had admitted to memory lapses that saw only 2% of the measures introduced in the 
budget being subjected to equality oversight.  The Fawcett Society was ultimately 
unsuccessful in persuading the court to instruct a full judicial review of the gendered effects 
of Osborne’s path-setting first budget and his commitment to arbitrary numerical indicators 
of policy performance.  Yet it was granted a preliminary permission hearing to air its 
objections in public.  This led to many intensely awkward moments for Treasury officials, 
who were required to defend in court both the process through which the 2010 Emergency 
Budget was written and the style of policy-making it exemplified. 
 
Mr Justice Ouseley, the presiding judge at the permission hearing, confirmed that Section 
149 of the Equality Act 2010 applied to all budgetary decisions at every level of government 
(Busby, 2014).  This is the Public Sector Equality Duty, according to which officials are 
required to make an assessment of whether any group that the Equality Act 2010 protects 
against discrimination is disproportionately affected by new policy measures (Fredman, 
2011, p.302).  It mandates that ‘due regard’ is given to enumerating the likely pattern of 
harms that will follow a fundamental change of policy course, as well as to finding ways of 
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mitigating those harms.  Mandatory Gender Equality Impact Assessments are meant to act 
as a legislative antidote to the regressive tendency that Hege Skjeie (2006, p.87) has 
captured with the evocative phrase, the “duty to yield”.  This is a situation in which formal 
commitments to gender equality exist but are consistently relegated behind other policy 
objectives. 
 
One constant refrain from Osborne throughout his tenure at the Treasury was that every 
other aspect of policy was subordinate to deficit reduction (Heppell, 2013, p.276).  Yet it is 
clear from the fact that he overwhelmingly chose expenditure cuts and not tax increases as 
the means of deficit reduction that he was not prepared to defer even to the notion of a 
Gender Equality Impact Assessment.  He was still fighting this battle well into the second 
half of the 2010-2015 Parliament, insisting that: “Our country’s problem is not that it taxes 
too little.  It is that its government spends too much” (Osborne, 2013, p.5).  In the first 
budget of the subsequent Parliament he further institutionalised the formula for budgetary 
balance of 80% expenditure cuts and 20% tax increases by introducing “a tax lock to prohibit 
any increase in the main rates of income tax, national insurance and VAT for the next five 
years” (Osborne, 2015d, p.24).  However, what Elson and Çagatay (2000, p.1355) have 
called the ‘male breadwinner bias’ historically embedded in macroeconomic policy ensures 
that, on average, men pay more tax than women.  Deactivating the tax mechanism as an 
instrument of fiscal policy thus serves merely to harden the existing disparity.  Tax receipts 
are typically also spent unevenly, but this time to the advantage of women.  The decision to 
focus deficit-reduction strategies on savings out of current expenditure thus created new 
harms for women that statutory equality laws were designed to overcome. 
 
As a consequence, there is something rather more than Skjeie’s ‘duty to yield’ in operation 
here.  Feminist scholars have long discussed the deflationary bias they identify in the type of 
rules-based macroeconomic policy that Osborne consistently advocated (Elson, 2004, pp.67-
8).  This has often been used to say that no more money is available to finance additional 
expenditures that will have a positive influence on women’s lives.  The underlying mindset 
of macroeconomic policy can therefore all-too-easily tip over into the assumption that 
gender equality is an “unaffordable luxury at a time of public spending restraints” (McKay et 
al, 2013, p.115).  However, we are not talking about additional new expenditures here, so 
8 
 
much as protecting existing spending plans.  According to the Fawcett Society (2012, p.5), 
Osborne’s refusal to contemplate launching such a defence created a situation of “triple 
jeopardy” for UK women following the financial crisis.  Women have been 
disproportionately affected by cuts to jobs (because of labour market crowding effects that 
make them, on average, much more likely to be in public sector employment), cuts to 
benefits (because usually they take on the major share of caring duties across society as a 
whole) and cuts to services (because their social rights are typically seen to be the most 
dispensable).  This triple jeopardy has been quantified to suggest that women shouldered 
well over three-quarters of the burden of Osborne’s deficit-reduction strategy between 
2010 and 2015 (Gayle, 2015). 
 
 
From Gendered Macroeconomic Policy Content to Osborne’s Machonomics 
 
It is therefore really rather straightforward to show that macroeconomic policy content was 
clearly gendered under Osborne’s stewardship, but I am hoping to do more than that.  The 
specialist feminist literature on the gendered consequences of rules-based macroeconomics 
takes us closer to the argument I wish to pursue.  This literature is still rather sparse, but it 
has nonetheless provided a number of compelling insights.  A rules-based macroeconomics 
focuses on practices that serve to tie the hands of government, including those moments in 
which governments are themselves responsible for their circumscribed room for manoeuvre 
by embedding the policy rules in law.  The recent preponderance of such rules has 
facilitated an anti-deficit radicalism that redistributes income, resources and life chances 
away from women (Hoskyns and Rai, 2007, p.311).  The language of ‘sound’ 
macroeconomics exhorts a particular understanding of soundness, one that prioritises 
abstract numerical indicators of policy performance because they are easily translated into 
market-based criteria that enshrine a highly gendered emphasis on deficit elimination (Elson 
and Çagatay, 2000, p.1348).  Feminist scholars have already presented Osborne’s time in the 
Treasury in these terms to great effect. 
 
However, it is interesting to explore an area where the feminist literature has not yet really 
ventured in an attempt to explain this phenomenon: namely, the relationship between 
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macroeconomic policy outcomes and the economic theory that underpins them.  Rules-
based policies are an increasingly common part of lived experience around the world today 
(Taylor, 2013, p.374), but they were justified in economic theory significantly before any 
government began to experiment with them in practice (Dellas and Tavlas, 2016, p.213).  
These theories eventually alighted on the advantages of placing policy-making in the hands 
of a specifically conservative policy-maker (Drazen, 2000, p.527).  Agency matters, then, 
both as an idealisation of conservative instincts in the relevant theoretical models and as a 
manifestation of real-world conservatism in Osborne’s case.  Something more therefore 
needs to be said about the particular characteristics of the Rogoff-type conservative policy-
maker. 
 
There is one thing about him – and it cannot be reiterated often enough that the theory 
always depicts the conservative policy-maker as a ‘him’ – that is almost certainly going to 
jump off the page at anyone with memories of Osborne-style austerity.  The Rogoff-type 
policy-maker is someone who, irrespective of the specificities of the historical context, 
always argues for a more austere macroeconomic policy setting than society as a whole 
would voluntarily select (Froyen and Guender, 2007, p.119).  The social inequalities 
generated by the UK Government’s embrace of austerity since 2010 could therefore, at one 
level, be nothing particularly special.  They might be merely a reflection of what happens 
when economic theory is allowed to intrude on macroeconomic policy-making to create the 
space in which a conservative policy-maker can operate.  Whenever a Rogoff-type 
conservative policy-maker is present, this is the outcome that should be expected.  What 
are the agential characteristics, then, that in his case bundle up particular aspects of 
masculinity into a performance ethos for macroeconomic policy?  And where might we have 
seen Osborne most obviously exhibiting such characteristics? 
 
This is about the implicit assumptions relating to gender orders that animate theoretical 
claims to knowledge within macroeconomics.  The Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker 
has a complete conviction that he alone has access to the correct settings for policy.  
Indeed, the entire tradition of macroeconomic models out of which he arose is set within a 
more general respect for regimes of truth (le Heron and Carre, 2006, p.58).  There is, by 
definition, only one solution for all macroeconomic models constructed as constrained 
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optimisation problems, and the Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker was only introduced 
into such models as a means of describing how the optimal solution might be made to 
materialise (Rogoff, 1985, p.1169).  He must be able to display an almost sociopathic delight 
in assuming that he is right when everyone else is telling him that he is wrong.  There can be 
no doubts allowed into his mind, even when he is surrounded by people recounting how 
much pain his policies are causing.  He must have full command of himself and must be 
willing to impose his views dogmatically if required. 
 
The Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker operates in a different realm to those where 
economic studies of masculinity typically apply.  He is a public official involved in policy-
making, whereas these existing studies almost always focus on examples of men who, in the 
popular imagination, bestride the corporate world.  Yet still the hypothetical conservative 
policy-maker of economic theory appears to embody what Joan Acker (2004, p.29), writing 
about these private sector folk heroes, describes as a hegemonic masculinity “that is 
aggressive, ruthless, competitive, and adversarial”.  Rogoff’s policy-maker must be 
aggressive in the extent to which he closes down the space in which an alternative common-
sense might be allowed to flourish, ruthless in using whatever it takes to mobilise people to 
his vision of managing the economy in line with arbitrary numerical indicators of policy 
performance, competitive in assuming that his will must always prevail, and adversarial in 
his approach to denouncing opponents.  He exudes the detached cogito that features in 
studies of both masculinity and the basic decision-making model of economics (Nelson, 
1993, p.27; England, 1993, p.37).  Indeed, he takes such detachment to the extreme in the 
importance that he vests in his own understanding of what makes for a sound 
macroeconomic policy. 
 
All of Acker’s characteristics of contemporary hegemonic economic masculinity are present 
in what his critics have called Osborne’s “fetish for a budget surplus” (Spencer, 2016).  
Economic theory suggests a solution for a Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker who has 
less faith in his colleagues’ self-denying ordinance than in his own.  He can create an 
institutional structure that prevents future policy-makers from weakening when he would 
not, should their conscience provide them with incentives to depart from the stipulated 
long-term policy path (Barro, 1986, p.23).  Osborne’s budget surplus rule suffered from the 
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obvious flaw that his successors could simply revoke it, as Theresa May (2016, p.2) proved 
really rather devastatingly when using the speech announcing her party leadership bid to 
cancel his timetable to a surplus in the wake of the EU referendum in 2016.  Whilst it lasted, 
though, it was designed to elevate his opinion on the preferred settings of macroeconomic 
policy over all possible alternative opinions, both those opinions being voiced now and 
those opinions that might be voiced in the future.  His Fiscal Charter was announced in his 
first budget after the 2015 General Election and subsequently put to a vote in the House of 
Commons that autumn.  It embodied unlimited self-assurance spilling over into the overtly 
macho assertion that his had always been the right path to follow.  Little is required to 
detect the sociopathic delight in hegemonic masculine self-assurance that is in operation 
here.  The Fiscal Charter, Osborne (2015d, p.6) argued, “commits our country to [the] path 
of budget responsibility.  While we move from deficit to surplus, the Charter commits us to 
keeping debt falling as a share of GDP each and every year.”  The lengthening time horizons 
that are generally treated as evidence of responsible masculine decision-making are thus 
stretched out to incorporate an indefinite future.  The absence of more concerted dissent to 
the conceits of appealing to an infinite time horizon was far from an accident.  A few letters 
were sent to the press from unconvinced economists at this time, but there were no real 
political flashpoints surrounding its passage through the House.  Both Parliament and the 
public had been softened up over a number of years to accept the basic thinking on which 
the Fiscal Charter was founded (see Hayton, 2014, p.16; Gamble 2015, p.54). 
 
The credentials of an ‘I know best’ policy-maker were evident right from Osborne’s first 
budget speech of the 2010-2015 Parliament: “I am not going to hide hard choices from the 
British people or bury them in the small print of the Budget documents.  You’re going to 
hear them straight from me, here in this speech” (Osborne, 2010b, p.2).  They were perhaps 
best exemplified when he was asked what would happen if things went wrong, what the 
back-up option to deficit reduction through expenditure cuts might be.  “There is no Plan B” 
was his response (Osborne, 2010c).  Starting off in this manner was always likely to mean 
that, later on, when pausing to reflect on what he had achieved, he would champion the 
opinion that he had seen further into the problem than anyone else and had the most 
precise grasp of what had to be done to put it right.  Addressing his audience at the Royal 
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Economic Society in January 2015, he stated without any sign of self-doubt that “[t]he 
argument about the past is settled” (Osborne, 2015a, p.7). 
 
Moreover, by this time, it was not just his programmes that he had taken to claiming were 
necessary.  In speech after speech in 2015 it became clear that he was positioning himself to 
convince others that he had also become personally necessary to their successful 
completion.  The policy path is undoubtedly the correct one to be following, he argued; 
trust me and perhaps me alone to stay the course.  “Having come this far”, he said in a 
speech in the City five weeks before the General Election, “the temptation is to think the 
task is almost complete and the job is done” (Osborne, 2015c, p.2).  “Our long-term 
economic plan is working”, he announced at the start of the Budget speech that followed 
the Conservatives’ re-election, clearly warming to his theme.  “But the greatest mistake this 
country could make would be to think all our problems are solved” (Osborne, 2015d, pp.1-
2).  This was an attempt to claim a vantage point to which he had privileged access and from 
which he should be allowed to close down dissenting voices.  His certainty in his own 
prescriptions for a budget surplus rule “is not a judgement based on ideological or party 
political grounds”, he reassured anyone who might have been tempted to think otherwise 
(Osborne, 2015a, p.9).  In his own mind at least, it was simply a matter of him doing what 
was right. 
 
The objective of macroeconomic policy was first changed from clearing off the deficit to 
budgeting for a surplus in Osborne’s Conference speech in 2013.  During every subsequent 
statement in the House of Commons, Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts were used 
to outline the path to the arbitrary numerical indicator of budgetary surplus (Osborne, 
2014a, p.4; 2015b, p.9; 2015d, p.5; 2016, p8).  The justification was that “it’s not enough to 
clean up the mess after it’s happened” (Osborne, 2013, p.5).  “I wish it were [a case of job 
done]”, he said subsequently, “but the harsh fiscal realities tell us it is not” (Osborne, 2015c, 
p.2).  The deficit was seemingly Osborne’s lone economic focus when he first became 
Chancellor, but a shift in emphasis from the budget deficit to managing the size of the 
national debt allowed him to claim that his chosen method of policy-making – and, by 
implication, he himself – had become necessary indefinitely.  Amply evident here is the 
machonomics instinct not to be cowed by even the faintest suspicion that other people’s 
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stories of personal hardship relate a reality that is just as important as the policy-maker’s 
own.  Even as Osborne subtly moved the goalposts on his own narrative frames by shifting 
forward in time the date when the deficit was to become a surplus, he proved entirely 
unresponsive to counter-narratives of deficit-reduction immiseration.  Acker’s account of 
the content of hegemonic economic masculinity is once again very easy to call to mind.  
“Running an overall surplus is the only sure way of getting our dangerously high national 
debt down”, argued Osborne (2014b, p.7), the choice of words highlighting that there was 
no room for disagreement.  This really rather ruthless elimination of the space for reasoned 
debate is what underpinned the “fundamental and simple principle” of his budget surplus 
rule (Osborne, 2015a, p.10).  “[J]ust running a balanced current budget does not secure [the 
objective] that … we must bring our national debt substantially down” (Osborne, 2014a, 
p.7). 
 
As the Fiscal Charter episode certainly demonstrates, time and again when Osborne had an 
autocue in front of him and television cameras pointing in his face, he displayed agential 
characteristics that are relatively easy to associate with the Rogoff-type conservative policy-
maker.  But from where did such a character emerge in the first place?  Asking this question 
allows for a further dimension of the gendered experience of UK austerity to be explored.  It 
also enables me to move beyond where the outer limits of the feminist critique of austerity 
are currently located. 
 
 
Macroeconomic Theory’s Conservative Policy-Maker 
 
Despite there being a massive body of published work in macroeconomics, almost none of it 
mentions the characteristics of individual policy-makers.  Policy is instead generally 
entrusted within the theory to an abstract entity called ‘the government’, but this is a 
crudely homogenised concept intended to denote the political realm in its entirety, and it is 
wholly divorced from the real-world dynamics of party political competition.  The one great 
exception is the 1985 article written by Kenneth Rogoff on the economic characteristics of 
an explicitly conservative policy-maker.  Rogoff used his article to suggest that one way of 
lowering the costs of gaining a reputation for credible policy signalling was to only consider 
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appointing people to policy-making positions who had been well known for some time for 
the socially unforgiving nature of their policy preferences.  If their reputation was already 
for not promising to do too much and for riding out political criticisms for being too austere, 
it would take less for them to subsequently demonstrate in post their reluctance to deviate 
from a pre-announced policy path (Rogoff, 1985, p.1170).  A Rogoff-type conservative 
policy-maker would have political instincts to always keep at arm’s length any demand for 
enhancing the overall size of state spending on individual welfare (Freedman, 2003, p.93).  
On its own, however, this reveals nothing about who the government is signalling to in its 
attempts to show that an explicitly conservative policy-maker is acting in its name, nor yet 
why it thinks it needs to engage in this particular type of signalling. 
 
For at least a decade before Rogoff’s article, macroeconomic theory was being 
conceptualised as an asymmetric game between the government and the private sector 
(Campoy and Negrete, 2006, p. 84).  The government was placed at a systematic 
disadvantage in such a game by having the traditionally masculine virtue of foresight 
withheld from it (Snowdon and Vane, 2005, p. 251).  Of course, in its original form the 
theory makes no attempt to highlight the point in this way.  However, the gendered 
characterisation of the game’s participants forms an indelible part of its proffered solution, 
even if it is never mentioned explicitly in those terms.  In this class of macroeconomic model 
the private sector could not be a more ideal personification of the hegemonic masculine 
economic behavioural traits that Raewyn Connell (2005), the key reference point for this 
mode of analysis, associates with global capitalism (see also Elias and Beasley, 2009, p.285). 
 
This whole tradition of macroeconomic theory really began with the publication in 1977 of 
Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott’s famous time consistency model.  They were the first to 
grant the private sector perfect foresight and, as such, imply that it had a time horizon 
stretching infinitely into the future (Gabisch and Lorenz, 1989, p.111).  The private sector is 
therefore presented as a masculine ideal-type, always able to ignore the temptations of 
short-term gains to be laser-focused on its long-term objectives.  The government, by 
contrast, simply does not have it within its make-up to act in an analogous manner.  It lacks 
the instinct for self-denial because of the electoral cycle, and as a consequence it is always 
likely to give in to societal demands for incrementally more spending.  The time consistency 
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tradition suggests that the private sector will therefore always have good reasons not to 
trust the government’s budgetary announcements. 
 
According to Kydland and Prescott (1977, p.475), the underlying problem is that the 
government is always likely to embrace discretionary forms of policy-making that lead it to 
renege on its pre-announced plans.  It is simply in its nature, they say, for the government to 
allow itself to be diverted from the optimal policy path.  It has to show that it is listening to 
societal pleas for additional help, otherwise it runs the risk of seeing its popularity wither.  
With the political system conceptualised as a mechanism through which society can make 
its grievances known, the government is necessarily compromised as a policy-maker due to 
its position at the very heart of the political system (Barro and Gordon, 1983, p.106).  In a 
Kydland-Prescott world, time inconsistency arises from the government’s desire to show 
that it understands society’s concerns and is prepared to internalise its preference for 
minimising social losses (Forder, 2000, p.4).  The policy-maker who cannot convincingly 
exhibit the hegemonic masculine countenance of knowing better than society what is in its 
long-term interests is destined always to be an ineffectual policy-maker because of its short-
term orientation.  The political wish to always be seen giving society what it wants is simply 
too great not to be acted upon. 
 
This is where the Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker enters the story (Rogoff, 1985, 
p.1170).  He has hegemonic masculine hard-headedness written into his very DNA.  His 
ability to turn the other way in the face of accusations that his policies have caused 
unnecessary hardship is what defines his conservatism in the first place.  He gains in 
reputation the more that he proves to have broken the link between the government and 
the political system by repeatedly saying ‘no’ to ever more desperate pleas for changing 
policy course (Backus and Driffill, 1985, p.530).  The Rogoff-type policy-maker comes across 
much in the manner of a Victorian father figure who is convinced that it is in the interests of 
his nearest and dearest to be subjected to the tough love he instinctively metes out. 
 
It is not to be expected that Osborne would be a perfect match for the purely abstract 
Rogoff-type policy-maker.  In particular, his choice to inhabit the persona of the Austerity 
Chancellor was in no sense an attempt to take macroeconomic policy-making somehow 
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beyond the boundaries of the political system.  This is the only reason for contracting a 
Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker in the theory.  However, Osborne’s embrace of a 
similar style of policy-making was precisely to place the Cameron Government at an 
advantage within UK politics (Kerr and Hayton, 2015, p.120).  The financial crisis that had set 
the backdrop for so much of the short-lived Brown Government was immediately seized 
upon specifically as one that was of Labour’s doing, with the Conservative-supporting 
newspapers dutifully reporting that only something akin to the Osborne plan could clear up 
‘Labour’s mess’ (Pirie, 2012, p.343).  Osborne has continued to bang this particular drum 
even after leaving Parliament.  In a recent London Evening Standard editorial that urged his 
erstwhile colleagues not to falter on the path to deficit elimination, he warned against 
“repeating the mistakes of the past that led Britain to the point where there was, in the 
words of that Treasury letter, ‘no money left’” (Osborne, 2017).  The electoral interests of 
the post-financial crisis Conservative Party have therefore aligned very closely with the 
policy content that one would expect to see emerge at the hands of a Rogoff-type 
conservative policy-maker who has been deliberately removed from the context of electoral 
politics. 
 
This one very important difference aside, it is remarkable how closely Osborne’s 
presentation of his policy objectives came to mirror the justification provided by the 
macroeconomic theory literature for appointing a specifically conservative policy-maker.  
Throughout his various set-piece economic speeches we see intimations of the hegemonic 
masculine virtue that the conservative policy-maker claims for himself when proving that he 
is sufficiently strong-minded not to be knocked off course by listening to what society says it 
would most like him to do.  It is as if there was only a single permissible script from which all 
of his speeches were fashioned.  In this regard, his early insistence that there was, and never 
could be, an alternative to reducing the deficit primarily through expenditure cuts clearly set 
the tone for his time as Chancellor (Osborne, 2010c).  But already that was merely following 
a pre-set pattern.  Whilst still Shadow Chancellor Osborne had signalled in the clearest 
possible terms the sort of policy-maker he could be expected to be by name-checking the 
time consistency tradition explicitly.  Whenever he would be called upon in office to choose 
between different possible courses of action, he told an assembled audience of economists 
and market-watchers, he would proceed in line with the following assumption about how 
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the economy works: “many of the same time consistency problems that lead to inflation 
bias when politicians are in direct control of monetary policy can lead to deficit bias in fiscal 
policy” (Osborne, 2010a, p.9). All along he asked to be judged in practice in exactly the same 
way that macroeconomic theory passes judgement on the Rogoff-type conservative policy-
maker. 
 
 
Osborne as the Conservative Policy-Maker 
 
Osborne’s policy script always started with an assessment of just how bad things had 
become during “the longest year-on-year rise in our national debt since the end of the 
seventeenth century” (Osborne, 2014a, p.8).  “[O]ur country was on the floor”, he lamented 
(Osborne, 2014b, p.2), “on the brink of bankruptcy” (Osborne, 2015f, p.25).  Osborne had 
himself presided over the final five years of this record-breaking thirteen-year run, but being 
able to announce its end was still politically important for him.  It allowed him to present 
the image that he personally – or, at the very least, the style of policy-making he had 
adopted – was responsible for ensuring that “Britain is walking tall again …  [F]rom the 
depths Britain is returning” (Osborne, 2015b, p.1, p.23).  And it was this in turn that allowed 
him to claim in what ended up being the last budget before his downfall that, “however 
strong the headwinds, we have held to the course we set out” (Osborne, 2016, p.1). 
 
For the purposes of this paper, this is the most fitting self-penned epitaph imaginable.  The 
conservatism of the conservative policy-maker is defined specifically by his ability to 
withstand pressure to renege on pre-announced policy commitments (Rogoff, 1985, 
p.1170).  He warrants appointment in the first place only because of his propensity to 
understand the social welfare function in a more fiscally hawkish manner than the median 
voter does (Lohmann, 1998, p. 14).  He must therefore be prepared to stay true to his 
principles even if they are not shared by society more broadly, and even if representatives 
of society are very vocal in pointing out this disparity.  Virtue is located in this hypothetical 
world in blocking out all encouragement to change your mind. 
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Osborne’s pronouncements as Chancellor suggest that he was also attempting to source 
virtue in a very similar way.  He used his first budget speech after the 2015 General Election 
to pat himself on the back for getting ever closer to meeting his long-term fiscal targets, but 
also to warn that “all that progress is at risk if we do not finish the job” (Osborne, 2015d, 
p.4).  The pre-set course must be followed to its logical conclusion, in other words, 
otherwise the private sector will begin to doubt the presence of the macroeconomic 
masculinity required to align the government’s interests with its own long-term horizons.  
Twelve months previously Osborne had said that “[m]any Chancellors, faced with a 
recovering economy and improved borrowing forecasts before an election, would be 
tempted to squander the gains [by giving society what it was asking for].  I will not do that” 
(Osborne, 2014a, p.7).  The same intimations abound throughout all his speeches at this 
time.  “We made a choice to leave behind a past of spending beyond our means, a past of 
borrowing from our children”, he told the Conservative Party Conference in 2014 (Osborne, 
2014b, p.3).  His justification for treating this as an irrevocable choice was that “the biggest 
risk is clear: abandoning the economic plan that is working” (Osborne, 2014a, p.3). 
 
The Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker is faced with no obvious political opponent to 
measure his self-denying ordinance against.  The policy-making game that he inhabits is set 
up on the simple premise that electoral interests will force any and, indeed, all political 
actors to cede to demands from within society for more spending.  Kydland and Prescott 
ensured that it is just not in the nature of the system he inhabits for him to do anything else 
(Eijffinger and Schaling, 1998, p. 51).  Osborne’s context, however, was clearly very different 
to that of the Kydland-Prescott world.  There were various moments when he was forced to 
face down opposition within a political system that displayed anything other than the dull 
homogeneity of the theoretical models.  Sometimes the challenges emerged from within 
the Coalition Cabinet (say, over university tuition fees), sometimes from the Chancellor’s 
own backbenches (over cuts to child tax credits and personal independence payments to 
people with disabilities), sometimes from the media (over his unwillingness to listen to the 
pleas of professional bodies about how socially disruptive his spending cuts were) and 
sometimes from global governance institutions (over his refusal to even consider the 
intellectual case for alternatives to austerity).  The presence of these opponents 
strengthened Osborne’s hand in his attempts to show how deeply he had internalised the 
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mantra of the time consistency tradition.  They made it possible for him to demonstrate the 
self-denying ordinance of the Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker in deed, whereas 
within the theory the same conservatism is granted by fiat. 
 
To present himself in this way, however, first required Osborne to act as a convert to the 
economic principles of the hegemonic masculinity that help to define the Rogoff-type 
conservative policy-maker.  The image of conversion initially began to emerge in a series of 
mea culpa statements suggesting that he had once thought along the same lines as those 
who now opposed him, before the financial crisis had caused reality to hit home.  Cameron 
had led the way in opposition in addressing the tension involved in blaming Labour’s 
spending plans for the financial crisis when previously the Conservatives had been 
committed to matching them (Smith and Jones, 2015, p.227).  Cameron apologised for 
having been seduced by the “cosy economic consensus” that made it difficult during his 
attempts at party modernisation to spot where the line should be drawn between 
responsible and irresponsible fiscal policy (cited in McAnulla, 2010, p.291).  By the time of 
the 2013 Conservative Party Conference, Osborne had made this argument his own.  Taking 
aim at the position that Labour was adopting at the time, he said: “I remember when we 
were in opposition and we made uncosted commitments and unworkable promises to 
abolish things like student fees.  We felt good at Conferences like these.  Then we lost 
elections.  David Cameron got us to face the truth about the way we had come to be seen.  
He forced us to be credible” (Osborne, 2013, p.4).  Every subsequent speech revolved at 
least to some degree around the “difficult decisions” that Osborne, as a newly emboldened 
conservative policy-maker, had latterly taken (e.g., Osborne, 2014a, p.4; 2015b, p.1; 2015f, 
p.1): “[c]hoices about whether we’re going to live within our means, or let rising debts 
threaten our economy again” (Osborne, 2014b, p.5). 
 
During the second half of the 2010-2015 Parliament, Osborne routinely appealed to his 
ability to withstand his opponents’ pleas to mitigate the hardship of spending cuts in order 
to champion his self-denying ordinance.  “There were moments”, he argued, “when lots of 
people had doubts whether our plans would work, moments, as I was well aware, when 
people had doubts about me” (Osborne, 2015e, p.2).  The Rogoff-type policy-maker has a 
mandate to act conservatively within the theory because it assumes that he knows what is 
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best for the economy but society does not.  Osborne became ever bolder in claiming an 
analogous omniscience for himself.  In his statement outlining his fiscal objectives for the 
2015-2020 Parliament, he said: “[W]hen I presented my first Spending Review in 2010 and 
set this country on the path of living within its means, our opponents claimed that growth 
would be choked off, a million jobs would be lost and that inequality would rise.  Every 
single one of those predictions have proved to be completely wrong …  And yet now, the 
same people are making similar claims about this Spending Review, as we seek to move 
Britain out of deficit into surplus.  And they are completely wrong again” (Osborne, 2015f, 
p.3, p.4).  He had to make every decision in that intervening period, he claimed, “in the 
teeth of opposition”, amidst “the clamour of our opponents”, and where still “[t]here are 
some who advise us to abandon our plan”, “those today who say: ease up, spend more, 
borrow more” (Osborne, 2015b, p.1; 2014b, p.2; 2015b, p.3; 2014a, p.7).  Osborne (2016, 
p.3) summed up the distinctiveness of his approach to macroeconomic policy-making in his 
final budget speech: “We saw under the last government what happened when a Chancellor 
of the Exchequer revised up the trend growth rate, spent money the country didn’t have, 
and left it to the next generation to pick up the bill.  I’m not going to let that happen on my 
watch”. 
 
All of this seems to be typical of the unrelenting approach of a policy-maker cast in the time 
consistency tradition.  However, Osborne does appear to have added an extra dimension 
uniquely his own during his latter days as Chancellor.  The primary characteristic of the 
Rogoff-type policy-maker is that he always stands alone, fixated with a preference on policy 
that is not shared by society more generally.  By contrast, Osborne increasingly portrayed 
the journey to deficit elimination as a common pursuit in which the broad swathe of the 
population was an active accomplice.  As early as party conference season in 2013, he felt 
able to declare that: “We’re turning Britain around.  And we say to the people of this nation: 
We secured the economy together” (Osborne, 2013, p.11).  A year and a half later, with an 
election imminent, he announced that: “The hard work and sacrifice of the British people 
has paid off”. 
 
In the aftermath of the 2015 General Election a further subtle shift took place in Osborne’s 
construction of the necessity of continued austerity.  He went from thanking the population 
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for allowing itself to be taken to a destination that would not have been its first choice, to 
saying that it was now fully convinced that his priorities were the only ones to be followed.  
It is in the nature of time consistency models that a farsighted policy-maker is required to 
lead society to where it otherwise would not go (Cukierman and Gerlach, 2003, p.3).  Yet 
with the return of a majority Conservative government in 2015 Osborne insisted that these 
roles had now been reversed and that Parliament must not now stand in the way of giving 
the population the fiscal policy mix it wanted.  This was a policy setting that, post-election, 
Osborne argued had been tailored specifically to “a level the British people are prepared to 
pay their taxes for” (Osborne, 2015f, p.8).  It was also what they had asked for.  “The British 
people have not put us here to congratulate ourselves.  They have put us here to do a job” 
(Osborne, 2015e, p.3).  The electorate was therefore no longer an obstacle that had to be 
overcome if the deficit was to be eliminated, so much as the principal to which the 
Chancellor, armed with his austerity programme and his allusions to the time consistency 
tradition, was now merely the agent.  “[R]emember this when our opponents line up to fight 
for every borrowed pound of government spending.  The British people have heard the 
argument that the deficit doesn’t matter and they’ve rejected it” (Osborne, 2015e, p.8). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is a symmetry to Osborne’s six years as Chancellor of the Exchequer.  He came to 
public attention during his time as Shadow Chancellor as a keen student of economics 
(Ganesh, 2012, p.127).  His most important speech of that period focused on both the deficit 
and debt.  It invoked the time consistency tradition explicitly to draw attention to the 
perceived need to stick to a pre-announced course to eliminate the budget deficit (Osborne, 
2010a, p.9).  When saying that this was the only means of keeping national debt within 
manageable bounds, he invoked Kenneth Rogoff by name when talking about his study, 
along with Carmen Reinhart (2009), of the trigger points where debt accumulation becomes 
critical (Osborne, 2010a, pp.3-4).  In the interim, in every speech in which he outlined his 
macroeconomic priorities, he adopted a narrative strategy that seemed designed to signal 
his credentials as a Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker suited to a Kydland-Prescott 
world of endemic time consistency problems.  This was perhaps never more clearly 
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demonstrated than in his later attempts to defend the integrity of his initial policy course, 
just as the time consistency tradition demands, by moving the goalposts from deficit 
elimination to surplus generation.  Rogoff and Reinhart’s national debt trigger points were 
still to the fore. 
 
Feminist scholars have long since maintained that the supposedly common-sense storylines 
that create the context for ‘sound’ economic policies consistently silence alternative 
standpoints with their privileging of overtly masculine character traits (Mutari, 2007, p.166).  
Osborne was never willing to relinquish his right to tell a purely economic story about 
Treasury policy or to ensure that this story was his alone.  May’s speech to announce her 
run for the Conservative Party leadership was the first time that he ever truly lost control of 
the narrative frames within which macroeconomic policy was ordered.  Storylines that guide 
the policy-making process close off other understandings of what the economy requires and 
of how much people should be prepared to give up to enable the economy’s needs to be 
met (Çağlar, 2010, p.67).  All policy-makers attempt to define the situation with which they 
are faced in a way that makes their chosen response seem sensible, desirable, natural even.  
Yet the Rogoff-type conservative policy-maker moves from here to the realm of 
machonomics in the sheer scale of the harms that he shuts his mind to as a means of 
continuing to successfully follow his chosen policy course.  Osborne’s tenure as Chancellor 
was replete with this style of policy-making (Bochel and Powell, 2016, p.14).  This makes it 
clear that it is not only the way that Osborne’s policies touched down within society that 
should be of interest.  It is equally important that he insisted on being judged as a particular 
type of policy-maker derived from a particular theoretical tradition in economics.  The 
manner in which he went about justifying the making of policy should therefore also be of 
interest. 
 
There are some relatively straightforward ways in which the conversation might be 
deepened between the feminist literature on macroeconomic policy outcomes and the 
economic theory of macroeconomic policy-making.  This will help to align more closely, on 
the one hand, how Osborne’s policies created new sources of systematic disadvantage 
within society (the current focus of the feminist literature on austerity) and, on the other 
hand, how he created reputational resources for himself that were designed to protect his 
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right to continue enacting those policies (the current focus of the economics literature on 
macroeconomic policy-making).  Perhaps most obviously, no discussion has yet been had of 
the way in which the macroeconomic policy-maker of economic theory reflects the wider 
gender order that ascribes sense-making to his decisions.  I have made a start in this regard 
by describing Osborne as a purveyor of machonomics, but what do we know about the 
abstract policy-maker of economic theory that Osborne seems to have wanted to embody?  
We can say for sure that he is always represented explicitly as a ‘he’ in the pages of the 
relevant theoretical journals, and we also know that this is a particular sort of ‘he’.  He has 
been named specifically as a conservative policy-maker of a Rogoff-type.  Beyond these two 
things, though, plenty of scope still exists for defining the characteristics of masculinity that 
must be in evidence if an actual macroeconomic policy-maker is to approximate the 
theoretical ideal-type.  Feminist economists have successfully deconstructed homo 
economicus, the most basic decision-maker to make an appearance in economic theory, so 
as to reveal the structures of masculinity on which he rests.  The Rogoff-type conservative 
policy-maker behaves in a much more complex manner than would be implied by a simple 
extension of the homo economicus model.  However, if we are ever going to transcend a 
deeply gendered experience of austerity, he too now needs to be exposed to the same 
critical deconstruction. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 I would like to thank for their perceptive comments on previous versions of this article the Co-Executive 
Editor of British Politics, Peter Kerr, Emma Foster, the journal’s anonymous referees and the participants in the 
‘Politics of Inequality’ panel at the PSA Conference in Glasgow in April 2017. 
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